Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model by Efstathopoulos, Charalampos
Aberystwyth University
Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model
Efstathopoulos, Charalampos
Published in:
Global Society
DOI:
10.1080/13600826.2017.1351422
Publication date:
2018
Citation for published version (APA):
Efstathopoulos, C. (2018). Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model. Global Society, 32(1), 47-69.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2017.1351422
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 03. Oct. 2019
	 1	
Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model 
Charalampos Efstathopoulos 
Abstract 
The behavioural model comprises a major theoretical tradition in the field of middle 
powers since it identifies the distinct behavioural patterns in the diplomacy of these 
states. Its relevance, however, has been questioned since it continues to rely on older 
definitions of middle power behaviour and places emphasis on diplomatic preferences 
rather than influence. To strengthen the relevance of the behavioural model, this 
article proposes an additional distinctive category that prioritises ideational influence 
and entrepreneurial effectiveness as key prerequisites for identifying middle powers. 
The article examines the cases of Brazil and South Africa to argue that states 
classified as middle powers must not only pursue the diplomatic preferences and 
strategies that comprise middle power internationalism, but also display the capacity 
to advance and secure their preferred outcomes at the international level. 
Key-words: Middle powers; behavioural model; internationalism; Brazil; South 
Africa. 
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Introduction 
The middle power concept has re-emerged in recent years as a popular approach for 
theorising non-great powers and the term has witnessed a revival given the amount of 
scholarship that is using this term. The rise of the global South in particular has led to 
expanding the middle power category to include a number of leading developing 
countries. The IBSA states (India, Brazil, South Africa) have closely been associated 
with the concept for the past two decades, while more recently, the MIKTA group 
(Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) has emerged to 
accommodate the interests of both established and emerging middle powers that seek 
to maximise their influence through new forms of coalition-building. At the same 
time, scholars have continued to dedicate attention to whether traditional middle 
powers such as Australia and Canada maintain a middle power status in the 
contemporary global system. Current developments such as the global economic crisis 
and the reform of global governance suggest that the demands placed upon middle 
powers are changing (Cooper, 2013). Increasing pluralism in global governance 
provides greater opportunities for states to assume middle power roles, but at the 
same time, inter-state competition for such positions has intensified substantially. In 
this respect, prospective middle powers will have to meet more demanding criteria for 
justifying such status in international relations, while the classification of middle 
powers must accommodate additional analytical variables. 
The literature on middle powers has traditionally been centred on the positional and 
behavioural models: the former identifies middle powers through the material 
capabilities that possess and the latter through the specific patterns they display in 
their diplomatic behaviour. The broader consensus in the literature is that middle-
ranking states must also meet a set of additional behavioural variables in order to be 
classified as middle powers (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a; Wang and French, 2013). 
While existing works provide extensive justifications on why particular states possess 
sufficient capabilities to be classified as middle powers, they often draw from existing 
and often out-dated behavioural definitions to explain why their chosen case studies 
also display the relevant diplomatic behaviour. The behavioural criteria used in the 
current literature mostly derive from older definitions that have not been extensively 
re-examined in the context of contemporary international relations. In this respect, the 
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discussion on material capabilities has evolved to account for changes in hard power 
project, and especially for the cases of developing countries and emerging economies, 
in contrast to a more static understanding of how middle powers behave 
diplomatically. 
This paper argues that the behavioural model can continue to constitute a core 
framework for identifying the preferences and behavioural patterns of middle powers, 
but requires an additional distinctive category in order to delineate the distinct types 
of internationalism and effectiveness that can be expected from contemporary middle 
powers. Such a distinctive category enhances the behavioural model by placing 
emphasis on types of ideational influence and entrepreneurial effectiveness that are 
not solely determined by material capabilities. Middle powers can therefore be 
understood not only as those middle-ranking states that advance distinct preferences 
and deploy distinct diplomatic methods, but also as those states that display both 
influence and effectiveness in realising their objectives at the international level. 
To justify why this distinctive category is required, the article first discusses how the 
behavioural model helps identify the foreign policy innovations that are practiced by 
certain middle-ranking states, and then argues that such a framework requires 
additional criteria that can lead to enhancing its relevance as an analytical framework. 
In the second section, the article proposes a distinctive category of the behavioural 
model that prioritises ideational influence and entrepreneurial effectiveness as key 
prerequisites for identifying middle powers. In the final section, the article applies this 
category to the cases of Brazil and South Africa. The article concludes that states 
classified as middle powers will not only have to deploy the diplomatic methods 
associated with middle power internationalism, but also be effective in advancing 
preferences and securing outcomes at the international level. 
 
Functionalism, identity and behaviour 
The behavioural model identifies patterns of foreign policy that are exercised mostly 
or exclusively by middle powers, and uses these patterns to distinguish middle powers 
from other categories of states. As David and Roussel note, “a Middle Power is a state 
which has significant international and global interests and defends them by adopting 
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a security and foreign policy style distinct from that of the Great Powers” (David and 
Roussel, 1998, p. 135). Such diplomatic behaviour is also distinct from that of small 
states and other middle-ranking powers. The behavioural model presupposes a 
substantial degree of agency and a perception of the country’s leadership that 
encourages foreign policy activism and internationalism (ibid). For this reason, the 
behavioural model has often been associated with functionalist and identity 
approaches that examine how states explicitly assume a ‘middle power’ role.  
Functionalism is an instrumental treatment of the middle power concept where a state 
adopts the ‘middle power’ label to declare its desired role in international affairs. 
Functionalism is developed in states where academic and policy-making circles 
deploy the idea of ‘middlepowermanship’ as the normative platform to operationalise 
their foreign policy agenda. Such middle power frameworks are subordinate to the 
foreign policy needs of self-identified middle powers and are attached to the historical 
experiences of these countries (Granastein, 1969; Holmes, 1970; Ungerer, 2007b). 
Functionalism represents the “ideologisation” of middlepowermanship since the 
concept is used to justify a special role for certain states, such as Australia and 
Canada (Ping, 2005, p. 1-8). Such states, however, may also internalise and project a 
middle power identity by embracing certain norms typical of middle power diplomacy 
(such as bridge-building diplomacy and humanitarianism), and self-imagining their 
roles in the international community as middle powers and responsible global 
citizens, although different states will have different perceptions of what that means 
(Patience, 2014). 
The fluctuations in the performance of self-identified middle powers reveal how the 
middle power concept has been manipulated to justify to domestic and international 
audiences the foreign policy initiatives of these states. In certain cases, the foreign 
policies of Western middle powers have not matched the influence expected of a 
middle power, but have nevertheless been framed as middlepowermanship exactly 
because policy-makers seek to legitimise their policies and grant greater authority and 
legitimacy to their diplomatic initiatives. As Hynek notes: “the suggested discrepancy 
between the linearity of discourse (of a middle power) and the variability of 
policymaking concerning Canadian foreign and security policy is an important 
finding with respect to the methodology associated with middlepowerhood” (Hynek, 
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2007, p. 139). Middlepowermanship serves as “a kind of discursive cement between 
completely different political practices” (ibid, p.141), and, as a result, obscures the 
objective theorisation of middlepowermanship by associating the concept with 
political practices that fall short of the international influence that middle powers can 
normally deliver. Cox was one the first theorists to propose for detaching 
middlepowermanship from functionalism and treating the term as an ideal-type of 
statecraft and foreign policy orientation that needs to be recast in the context of the 
world order. As Cox argues, “the middle-power role is not a fixed universal but 
something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of 
the international system” (Cox, 1989, p. 242). Cooper also suggests de-linking the 
middle power role from the proclamations of state leaders: “the classification of 
middle powers as a separate class of countries in the hierarchy of nations stands or 
falls not on their subjective identification but on the fact that this category of actors 
engages in some distinctive form of activity” (Cooper, 1997a, p. 7). 
Functionalism and identity approaches cannot therefore provide an independent 
analytical threshold for distinguishing middle powers since self-identification cannot 
determine the foreign policy performance of assertive middle-ranking states. Such 
theorisation “conflates the role identity (national self-conception) of middle power 
states, with the role performance (foreign policies) of those states in international 
politics” (Easley, 2012, p. 422). Since states can exhibit middle power behaviour 
without endorsing the ‘middle power’ concept, middle power classification cannot be 
based on politically charged contexts (Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p. 15). Many states 
that proclaim major power ambitions actually follow a middle power foreign policy, 
while self-identified middle powers will often fail to meet the standards of an 
independent analytical framework of middle power behaviour. 
The behavioural model aims to address the ambiguities of functionalism and the 
subjectivity of self-identification, and proposes that middle powers can be identified 
by the framing and pursuit of distinct foreign policy agendas at the international level. 
States that possess middle-range capabilities but display lack of an internationalist 
foreign policy are not included in the middle power category. Middle power 
behaviour is evident in both the expression of a particular foreign policy agenda and 
the strategies deployed to realise this agenda. In both aspects, the major definition is 
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provided by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (Cooper et al, 1993, pp. 19-25), and suggests 
that the behaviour of middle powers is defined by three major preferences: (i) 
projecting good international citizenship as the normative basis of foreign policy, (ii) 
seeking multilateral agreements to resolve global problems; and (iii) assuming crisis 
management initiatives to alleviate instability in global affairs. To realise these 
objectives, middle powers pursue three types of strategies: (i) niche diplomacy that 
helps concentrate diplomatic resources in specific regimes, (ii) intellectual and 
entrepreneurial leadership to overcome limitations in material resources, and (iii) 
coalition building with like-minded states (ibid). 
While these behavioural patterns are envisaged to constitute a universal typology, the 
behavioural model has been criticised for its tautology. The problem of tautology is 
that “middle powers are those that practice middle power internationalism” while at 
the same time, “middle power internationalism describes the behaviour of middle 
powers” (Chapnick, 1999, p. 76). Middle powers are understood to adopt middle 
power behaviour because this reflects their national role conception and the 
expectations associated with foreign policy activism. The problem of tautology 
becomes evident when the behavioural model expands to include non-Western states. 
Since the behavioural model is historically defined by the experiences of Western 
middle powers, it appears that these experiences are arbitrarily applied to their foreign 
policy of non-Western states, even though the latter project different behavioural 
patterns (Robertson, 2005, pp. 19-24). This problem can potentially be solved by 
integrating new behavioural characteristics distinctive to non-Western states, but this 
causes a ‘conceptual stretching’ and a narrower use of the middle power concept that 
effectively renders the behavioural methodology as flawed and irrelevant (Manicom 
and Reeves, 2014, p. 31). 
Three points can be put forward for addressing the problem of tautology. First, many 
authors, including certain critics, recognise that the problem of tautology becomes 
greater if we rely exclusively on behavioural patterns and preferences. As Ravenhill 
argues, “to identify middle powers primarily by reference to the activities they choose 
to pursue…is again to risk reducing the concept to little more than a tautology” 
(Ravenhill, 1998, p. 325). These activities are not a sufficient indicator since we need 
to identify the full range of choices and constrains that allow middle powers to engage 
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in such activities. Nevertheless, “an emphasis on diplomatic capabilities and the 
capacity to provide intellectual leadership is a useful starting point in attempting to 
define the core characteristics of middle powers” (ibid). In a similar vein, Shin argues 
that despite the criticism of tautology, the behavioural model allows for shifting the 
discussion “to the roles (middle powers) play and what they can do in the 
international arena” (Shin, 2015, p. 6, emphasis in original). It also detaches middle 
powers from “normative burdens” and altruistic politics, and allows for a more 
specific categorisation of the conditions and choices that allow middle power to 
perform a distinctive influential role (ibid). The behavioural model therefore 
contributes to identifying the greater commonalities between certain middle-ranking 
states (compared to other categories of states), and does not claim, as critics argue, to 
establish “common sets of relations between common patterns of middle-power 
behaviour” (ibid, p. 5). 
In the same vein, Behringer notes that the behavioural model “is conducive for the 
development of a theory of middlepowermanship” because it shifts focus to a “sub-
set” of middle-ranking states that display both the willingness and capacity to 
consistently engage in foreign policy internationalism (Behringer, 2013, p. 14). Such 
a behavioural contribution to middle power theorisation does not contradict the 
positional model, but complements and enhances it (Stephen, 2013). It is actually 
possible for the behavioural model to align with both positional and functionalist 
approaches. Such middle powers would meet all possible definitions; i.e. possessing 
middle-range material capabilities, adopting and projecting middle power identity, 
and exhibiting middle power behavioural patterns in its foreign policy (Gilley and 
O’Neil, 2014a, p. 15; Manicom and Reeves, 2014, p. 33). The behavioural can 
therefore accept that middle powers will occupy intermediate positions in the 
international hierarchy of states, and exhibit both material and behavioural attributes 
that allow them to pursue distinct diplomatic roles. While an over-reliance on specific 
behavioural attributes can be problematic and tautological, any definition of middle 
powers must include a set of broader behavioural criteria (Stephen, 2013, p. 39). 
This clarification leads to a second point. The behavioural model can deal with the 
problem of tautology by accepting that middle powers must not conform to the very 
specific type of activism displayed by certain traditional (mainly Western) middle 
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powers. It is possible to detach and de-link middle power internationalism from 
country-specific experiences, even if the latter initially played an important role in 
defining the behaviour of middle powers. Such a strategy “avoids both the pitfalls of 
the normative-idealist view of middlepowermanship as well as resisting the 
temptation to reject it altogether” (Hynek, 2007, pp. 139-140). Instead, the middle 
power concept can be treated as an “empty form” or blank “political category” that 
can be re-constructed at different historical junctures (ibid, p. 140).  
While behavioural approaches can recognise how certain Western states have 
historically defined middle power internationalism, they can also overcome these 
country-specific experiences and construct a “Weberian ideal type of middle power” 
(Carr, 2014, p. 74). Certain works have engaged in such an exercise to argue that 
despite the particular shape of internationalism that is projected by specific middle 
powers, certain core tendencies continue to characterise the behaviour of both 
Western and non-Western middle powers (Jordaan, 2003; Ping, 2005). The core 
behavioural patterns that derive from internationalism are relevant to both Western 
and non-Western states, even if such internationalism takes a different shape for each 
state. For example, middle powers can adopt different approaches to multilateralism, 
global citizenship and coalition-building, and their assertive foreign policies might 
support or challenge major power preferences. The emphasis itself, however, on 
multilateralism, global citizenship, coalition-building and an independent foreign 
policy remains at the core of the behavioural model (as discussed in detail in the next 
section). 
Third, and linked to the above, the core patterns of the behavioural model appear to be 
consistently relevant to the study of middle-ranking states, independently of the 
historical role of Western middle powers in pursuing their preferred type of 
internationalism. Changing international conditions and the choices of middle-ranking 
states may, hypothetically, render the behavioural model irrelevant at a particular 
historical point. If international conditions do not permit for middle power 
internationalism and if states do not engage (either because of choice or constraint) in 
such activism, then the behavioural model will need to be radically revised or 
dismissed altogether. As Gilley and O’Neil note, however, “there has been a 
remarkable consistency in the general and unique expectations of middle power 
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behaviour since World War II, with only some modifications of the language used” 
(Gilley and O’Neil, 2014a, p. 10). 
The actual developments that have occurred during and after the end of the Cold War 
appear to strengthen the relevance of the behavioural model. The formation of the 
G20 Leaders Summitry since 2008 and the reform processes in the Bretton Woods 
economic institutions have provided greater access to middle powers to participate in 
the management of key global issues (Cooper, 2013). Major powers such as the US 
and China have also invited middle powers to assume more responsible roles, 
recognising their ideational, rather than purely material, influence in shaping regional 
affairs (Azra, 2015). Also, the ability of states to influence international relations 
increasingly derives from functions such as ‘agenda-setting’, ‘custodianship’ and 
‘sponsorship’, all of which demonstrate the potential of non-material forms of 
leadership to serve as alternative paths to shaping global conventions (Reich and 
Lebow, 2014, pp. 36-49). Against such favourable international conditions, certain 
groups of states (such as the IBSA and MIKTA states) are capable of, and willing to 
grasp the available opportunities and act as drivers of reform in key areas of global 
governance. Overall, both international conditions and the choices of certain middle-
ranking states continue to favour the behavioural definitions of middle power 
internationalism. As the next section demonstrates, a new distinctive category of the 
behavioural model can contribute to further reinforcing the relevance of the 
behavioural model. 
 
A distinctive category of the behavioural model 
The first proposition of the behavioural model is that states can be classified as 
middle powers when they act as good international citizens that contribute to the 
welfare of the international community. Such ‘humane internationalism’ grants a 
normative ‘edge’ to the middle power concept, leading certain analysts to suggest that 
such novel motivations distinguish middle powers from other egoistic states (Pratt, 
1990). Good international citizenship is often associated with the Nordic middle 
powers since these states have historically projected on the international stage their 
domestic socio-economic values of welfare, redistribution and human rights. The 
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normative context of good international citizenship often leads to the assumption that 
middle power foreign policy is driven by moral considerations and takes the form of 
Western liberal internationalism. This process, however, does not necessarily 
privilege cosmopolitan over national interests, but rather identifies the national 
interest in cosmopolitanism since the advancement of universal welfare and justice is 
perceived as essential for achieving a distinct international status. The normative 
context of good international citizenship has led to the misperception that small states, 
such as Norway and Denmark, which excel in demonstrating their peace credentials 
through internationalism can be classified as middle powers. While this was possible 
during the North-South dialogue of the 1970s, these states now struggle to retain a 
visible international status of moralpolitik due to increasing pluralism in global 
governance and competing forms of good international citizenship (Kuisma, 2007). 
Altruism cannot therefore comprise a criterion for classifying middle powers for two 
reasons: first, because it is often driven by status-seeking behaviour, and, second, 
because it is traditionally framed in the language of Western liberal internationalism. 
With regards to the first aspect, behavioural approaches have argued that middle 
powers may act as guardians of humanitarian values for instrumental purposes, 
without having internalised these norms in their domestic institutions. National and 
cosmopolitan interests may be amalgamated in a form of enlightened self-interest that 
dictates for providing global public goods but at the same time enhances a state’s 
international status (Neack, 2003, pp. 165-166; Wheeler and Dunne, 1998, pp. 853-7). 
Achieving a good citizen reputation is a major interest of middle powers since it 
allows them to enjoy an international status as credible actors and expect reciprocity 
from other states (Evans, 2011). Notwithstanding, however, the degree of altruism 
embedded in middle power foreign policy, the choice to engage in good citizenship 
remains an important criterion for identifying middle powers. As Nossal argues: “the 
key is the voluntary nature of the activity: in other words, one’s self-interest would 
still be served if one chose not to engage in the acts of good international citizenship 
that are the hallmark of internationalism” (Nossal, 1998/99, p. 100). Behavioural 
approaches have clarified that states can qualify as middle powers if they demonstrate 
consistency and commitment in acting as good international citizens, even though 
such commitment may derive either from instrumental calculation or socialisation to 
humanitarian values. 
	 11	
Even when international moralpolitik, however, is detached from altruism and 
morality, it remains framed in the language of Western liberal internationalism. Such 
language fails to account for the types of good international citizenship that reflect 
non-Western values and address non-Western audiences. The ethical objectives 
pursued by Western good citizen states are contested by states in the global South that 
perceive the liberal order and the norms it entails as exclusionary and discriminatory 
(Linklater, 1992, pp. 32-33). For developing countries, a broader notion of global 
citizenship advances the democratic conduct of international relations and “requires 
support for collective action to improve the conditions of the unfairly excluded” (ibid, 
p. 36). Good international citizenship cannot be limited to Western solidarist values 
but may also embed pluralist values such as sovereignty, non-interference and non-
intervention (Dunne, 2008, pp. 25-6). The alternative forms of global citizenship that 
are pursued by Southern powers espouse an international society that allows for 
reforming global governance to enhance the representation of the South, and 
promotes collective action against threats deriving from both Western hegemony and 
radical actors such as terrorist groups (Phillips, 2013). States can therefore be 
classified as middle powers if they consistently frame their foreign policy in a context 
of good international citizenship that is inclusive of, but not limited to liberal 
internationalism. 
The second criterion of the behaviour model is that states can be classified as middle 
powers if they demonstrate a strong preference for multilateralism and engage in 
multilateral activism in their foreign policy. Such states perceive international 
institutions as the ideal framework for governing international affairs and strive to 
provide multilateral solutions to global problems (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997, p. 151). 
They also engage in multilateral activism to overcome a lack of bargaining power at 
the unilateral and bilateral level, and gain legality, legitimacy and moral authority for 
their assertive diplomatic initiatives (Henrikson, 1997). Given their propensity for 
good international citizenship, middle powers would have a greater stake in 
advancing multilateralism compared to other states due to their opportunities provided 
by multilateral arrangements for advancing their ideas and interests (Doran, 1989, p. 
4). Prospective middle powers can use multilateral fora to project their image as good 
citizens on the global stage and demonstrate their ethical adherence to peace and 
stability (Schoeman, 2000). The behavioural model overall suggests that states 
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classified as middle powers will need to demonstrate a greater commitment to 
multilateralism, consensus-building and “cooperation-mindedness” compared to other 
states (Wood, 1987, pp. 25-6). 
The problem with this definition is that the preference for multilateralism and 
multilateral activism does not necessarily translate into actual influence. States might 
have ambitious preferences for influencing international regimes but such ambitions 
often prove to be unrealistic. States that classify as middle powers would therefore 
need to be relatively effective in realising their multilateral objectives. If such 
influence is eroded, then multilateral activism remains an ambitious but unfeasible 
exercise in foreign policy. Certain behavioural works have noted how such influence 
must be evident, although the distinction between preference, activism and actual 
influence is not always clearly identified. For example, middle powers must “make 
contributions to multilateralism equal or greater than their status and resources as 
middle-sized states, (which allow for) distinguishing them as a significant category in 
the international hierarchy between the great powers and small states” (Doran, 1989, 
p. 4). They must be capable of sustaining the smooth operation of existing institutions 
or even supporting the formation of new institutions (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997, p. 
151). They must also have the ability to protect their core interests against major 
powers and “alter or affect specific elements of the international system in which they 
find themselves” (Carr, 2014, p. 79). While these approaches stress the need to assess 
middle power influence, the degree and significance of such influence is not clarified. 
In this respect, it can be argued that most multilateral institutions could function in the 
absence of middle power agency. For middle power influence, however, to be truly 
identifiable we must assume that lack of such agency would affect the legitimacy and 
functionality of an international regime. 
The third criterion of the behavioural model proposes that states can be classified as 
middle powers if they provide leadership in crisis management and demonstrate 
activism as intermediates in international disputes and conflicts. Crisis management 
logically derives from the aforementioned attributes of good international citizenship 
and preference for multilateralism, and can be evident in both the security and the 
economic sphere. Compared to major powers, certain middle-ranking states are not 
associated (at least not to the same degree) with hegemonic politics and are more 
	 13	
favourably viewed as neutral peace brokers (Hampson, 1992, p. 201). Since such 
states commit to acting as good international citizens, then assuming conflict-
resolution initiatives is critical to enhancing their humanitarian status (ibid, pp. 203-
4). As in the case of good international citizenship, crisis management cannot be 
misperceived as altruism but must be recast as status-seeking behaviour. Critical 
approaches to the behavioural model have provided such arguments to suggest that 
assuming crisis management initiatives reflects a world-view that favours a peaceful 
global order and stability (Cox, 1989; Jordaan, 2003; Neufeld, 1989). 
While behavioural approaches examine how crisis management can comprise a 
status-seeking and interest-seeking strategy, they remain limited to focusing on 
preferences rather than actual impact. States that classify as middle powers, however, 
will have to be effective in crisis management rather than merely demonstrating a 
preference for mediating diplomacy. Previous behavioural approaches have been 
limited in making this clarification. In works where the issue of diplomatic ability is 
discussed, middle powers are understood to promote crisis management and systemic 
stability because of their inability to engage in systemic revisionism like major 
powers (David and Roussel, 1998, p. 135). Such a view, however, suggests that 
leadership in crisis management is a reflection of weakness rather than influence. This 
paper argues that states included in the middle power category would have to perform 
a critical role in maintaining or restoring the stability of international regimes. For 
such agency to truly matter, middle power diplomacy must provide the catalyst in 
alleviating impending or on-going crises, while lack of such involvement would have 
to be detrimental to resolving a crisis. 
The fourth aspect of the behavioural model suggests that states that qualify as middle 
powers tend to perform niche diplomacy to secure their influence in international 
regimes (Cooper, 1997b). Niche diplomacy involves “concentrating resources in 
specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover 
the field” (Evans, 2011), and appeals to states lacking the capacity to spread their 
diplomatic resources across different regimes (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 311). Niche 
diplomacy is often misinterpreted as an innovative form of foreign policy that allows 
different states to ‘punch above their weight’. As Henrinkson, however, notes: “niche 
diplomacy, although often associated with very small countries, has in fact been more 
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fully developed by countries that have sufficient size and capacity to play notable 
roles on the international stage but that are not strong enough to impose their 
positions or solutions” (Henrikson, 2007, p. 67). Major powers can also dominate 
specific niches but do not face the need of practicing niche diplomacy. They can more 
effectively promote their preferences across multiple regimes while occasionally 
relying upon middle powers for resolving deadlocks that require neutrality and 
mediation (ibid). 
Such previous treatments of niche diplomacy assume a certain degree of influence but 
do not clarify the relationship between multilateral activism and niche diplomacy. The 
assumption seems to be that states that act as middle powers have an interest in 
various areas of multilateralism but can only realistically shape a proportion of such 
fora. Again, the disharmony between preferences and actual influence becomes 
evident. Given the above arguments that middle powers must demonstrate actual 
multilateral influence, the notion of niche diplomacy must be redefined as a broader 
form of selective engagement that entails two dimensions. First, selective engagement 
cannot be limited to a single area but must entail multiple areas of multilateralism. 
Second, selective engagement must target at critical and not peripheral areas of global 
governance. Such broader engagement requires middle powers to continuously 
engage with multiple niches and re-assess their options at critical historical junctures, 
such as the end of the Cold War (Potter, 1996/97). Selective engagement requires 
middle powers to provide advanced solutions to complex international problems and 
successfully interpret developments in international affairs in order to concentrate on 
the areas that require diplomatic intervention. Selective engagement can therefore be 
exercised across multiple regimes and for considerable duration, though it does not 
amount to the structural leadership exercised by major powers. 
The fifth aspect of the behavioural model proposes that states can qualify as middle 
powers when they provide intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership. Intellectual 
leadership allows states to shape negotiating outcomes through innovative policy-
making ideas, while entrepreneurial leadership refers to bargaining skills that help 
build consensus and overcome deadlocks (Young, 1991). Such forms of leadership 
allow middle powers to act as catalysts, facilitators and bridge-builders in regime 
formation and management (Cooper et al, 1993, pp. 24-25). Certain approaches note 
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that such forms of leadership can aggregate to a broader “directional leadership” that 
“sets an example others can follow” and persuades other states to adopt specific ideas 
and negotiating positions (Kanie, 2003, p. 342). States that excel in such roles may 
not possess extensive material capabilities as expected by the positional model, but 
can deploy ideational resources such as bureaucratic capacity, technical expertise and 
policy-making knowledge (Lee, 1999, pp. 20-24). Behavioural approaches use these 
definitions extensively to argue that middle powers are distinguished from other states 
by the ideational resources that are operationalised through their niche diplomacy 
(Higgott and Cooper, 1990). 
Such approaches to middle power leadership reveal the limitations of the positional 
model by suggesting that many states that possess material capabilities may lack the 
diplomatic skills that help engage with multilateral regimes. Middle power leadership 
entails a mix of material and ideational resources (and the balance between the two 
may be different for each state), but it is the latter that allows middle powers to 
perform assertive diplomatic roles. In comparison, major powers command a greater 
array of resources and are unlikely to depend upon intellectual and entrepreneurial 
leadership as primary tools of foreign policy. The behavioural model is recognised for 
its contribution to identifying such alternative forms of leadership, but these forms are 
frequently understood as largely constrained by major power politics (Emmers and 
Teo, 2015). Certain behavioural approaches note how middle powers can act as ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ in areas dominated by major power interests, such as international 
security, international peacekeeping and nuclear disarmament (Behringer, 2012; 
Ungerer, 2007a). Such perspectives note that middle power initiatives may challenge 
the core interests of major powers, but remain cautious in suggesting that such 
initiatives will be met with varying degrees of success. For the distinctive behavioural 
model proposed in this paper, intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership should 
withstand the pressures of major powers and middle powers should be able to act 
against the preferences of major powers even when the latter exercise their structural 
leadership in certain multilateral fora. States that qualify as middle powers would 
need to be effective in providing intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership not only 
in support, but also against the interests of major powers, and be effective in securing 
some of their core demands. Even when such forms of leadership do not secure the 
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preferred outcomes, they must be critical in enhancing middle power capabilities, 
such as the moral status and prestige. 
The final aspect of the behavioural model suggests that states that qualify as middle 
powers are inclined to form and lead coalitions with like-minded states (Higgott and 
Cooper, 1990; Lovbraek, 1990; Wood, 1990). Middle powers face resource 
constraints when acting unilaterally and bilaterally, and are therefore inclined to 
provide leadership in forming coalitions that allow them to exert disproportionate 
influence and establish relations of cooperation that are greatly facilitated by their 
entrepreneurial skills (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 312). Intellectual and entrepreneurial 
leadership allow middle powers to engage smaller states through process of 
persuasion and consensus building, rather than domination and coercion. Small states 
are more willing to joining groups deemed as more egalitarian and not dominated by 
major power politics (Lee, 1999, pp.20-23). Compared to other states, middle powers 
will demonstrate a great proclivity to leading coalitions with like-minded states and 
mobilising these to engage major powers in key multilateral fora (Gilley and O’Neil, 
2014b, p. 245; Hundt, 2011). Such groups may also entail cooperation between 
different middle powers that share a world-view that favours good international 
citizenship and multilateral activism (Hornsby and Van Heerden, 2013). Compared to 
other states, middle powers exhibit a more assertive coalition behaviour that aims to 
socialise and engage major powers, and avoid being confined to merely reacting to 
major power policies (Son, 2014). They may follow assertive ‘network positioning’ 
and ‘exclusive minilaterialism’ that accommodates different state and non-state actors 
but excludes major power participation (Watson, 2015).  
The traditional behavioural model assumes that middle powers will be relatively more 
effective in forming like-minded coalitions given their strengths as intellectual and 
entrepreneurial leaders. This approach can be problematic since such forms of 
coalitions can also be led by other states. A distinctive category of the behavioural 
model suggests that middle powers can provide leadership that is both indispensable 
in facilitating certain types of coalitions, and distinct from the band-wagoning and 
counter-balancing functions normally performed by other states. Indispensable 
leadership would mean that certain like-minded groups could not be formed in the 
absence of a middle power acting as the catalyst for cooperation. Middle power 
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coalitions would have to fulfil assertive roles and strategies that are not available to 
other regional or small states. Other middle-range states that lack entrepreneurial 
skills would have to resort to material interests for mobilising allied states and the 
degree of like-mindedness in such coalitions would be limited (at least initially) to 
common material gains. Middle power leadership must therefore be understood as 
indispensable not only in comprising the catalyst for the formation of like-minded 
coalitions, but also for attaining a convergence of state preferences not evident in 
other coalitions. Indispensable leadership must also entail a substantial degree of 
assertiveness and autonomy against major powers, maintaining coalition cohesion 
without being confined to a purely reactive mode. 
 
Cases of middle power behaviour: Brazil and South Africa 
The distinctive category of the behaviour model presented above can help clarify how 
different emerging and middle-range states can be categorised as middle powers. 
Brazil and South Africa can provide two relevant case studies for the behavioural 
model. In recent years, the two states have been included in the prestigious BRICS 
coalition that represents the leading economies of the global South, yet they have 
faced substantial limitations to their foreign policy ambitions that raise questions over 
their capacity to act as major players on a global scale. This final section examines 
whether the two countries meet the six behavioural criteria of the behavioural model 
outlined above, and helps understand how the distinctive category of the behavioural 
model can comprise a more coherent framework for classifying middle powers. 
The first aspect of the behavioural model suggests that states can be classified as 
middle powers if they consistently frame their foreign policy in a context of good 
international citizenship that is inclusive of, but not limited to liberal internationalism. 
Brazil and South Africa have consistently framed their foreign policy in a form of 
good international citizenship that integrates elements of liberal internationalism and 
Third Worldism. Brazil has traditionally endorsed the fundamental norms and values 
of the liberal international order, and especially the norms of non-intervention, self-
determination and equality of states. It has also supported the normative framework of 
Responsibility to Protect (RtP), but has opposed the distortion of the concept through 
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hegemonic, selective and unilateral practices of military intervention. In cases such as 
Kosovo, Libya and Syria, the Brazilian position has been that humanitarian 
intervention cannot be the pretext for regime change and must always be subject to 
the authority of the UNSC (Tourinho, 2015). South Africa has also demonstrated a 
commitment to resolving humanitarian crises, promoting regional stability and 
contributing to sustainable transitions to liberal democracy and good governance in 
post-conflict societies. South Africa’s approach, however, is critical of the Western 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) discourse, and emphasises ‘quiet diplomacy’, 
transitional justice and transitional power sharing as the principal pillars for achieving 
peace and stability (Beresford, 2015). 
For both Brazil and South Africa, solidarity with developing countries has often 
prevailed over liberal inclinations as both states have strived to act as representatives 
of the global South. For Brazil, the shift towards South-South solidarity and the 
support for greater equity, justice and fairness in the international society of states has 
been strongly evident during the Lula administration (2003-11). Brazil’s efforts at 
consolidating its status as leader of the developing world have even led it to accept 
certain costs in terms of pursuing its own material interests in fora such as the G20 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Doctor, 2015). For this reason, Brazil has 
refrained from assertively pursuing its national developmental interests in issues such 
as food security and duty & quota free (DFQF) market access in the WTO, and 
exchange rate misalignment and currency wars in the G20 (ibid). South Africa also 
gradually shifted to a Southern agenda in its foreign policy during the Mbeki 
administration (1999-2008) and this trend has been enhanced under the current Zuma 
presidency (2008-). South Africa’s bridge-building position between the West and 
Africa has often been undermined by the country’s willingness to defend the 
sovereignty of so-called ‘rogue’ states such as Iran and Zimbabwe, and adopt a 
critical stance towards institutions such as the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Black and Hornsby, 2016). 
The propensity of Brazil and South Africa towards good international citizenship 
demonstrates their preoccupation with enhancing their international status. Such 
status-seeking behaviour has propelled the two states to address both a Western and a 
Southern audience. First, they have sought to appeal to the West as key partners that 
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can help bring stability to Southern regions in terms of economic development, 
democracy promotion, institution building, and resolution of humanitarian crises. 
While assuming such responsibilities facilitates the efforts of Brazil and South Africa 
to gain permanent member status in the UNSC, the two states have been reluctant to 
fully collaborate with the West for fear of abolishing their status as representatives of 
the global South. They have instead often prioritised providing public goods for 
developing countries by demanding greater recognition for Southern issues, such as 
poverty, inequality, non-interference and respect for sovereignty (Alden and 
Schoeman, 2015b; Hirst, 2015). In both countries, domestic NGOs and civil society 
actors have also placed pressure on their governments to remain committed to a more 
ethical foreign policy that favours humanitarian issues over geopolitical calculations. 
For both Brazil and South Africa, balancing between these different objectives has led 
to ambivalence and competing objectives in their foreign policies. Despite such 
contradictions, both Brazil and South Africa’s foreign policy continues to be framed 
as a form of Southern international citizenship that advances norms of governance 
that are legitimate in the global South. While such a form of citizenship faces 
difficulties when it is operationalized (as discussed below), the consistency with 
which it is framed and projected allows both states to meet this first criterion of good 
international citizenship. 
The second criterion of the behavioural model suggest that Brazil and South Africa 
can be classified as middle powers if they are effective in realising their multilateral 
objectives, and if their diplomatic agency affects the legitimacy and functionality of 
significant multilateral regimes. Brazil and South Africa have demonstrated a 
historical commitment to multilateralism and under the administrations of President 
Lula and President Mbeki, they adopted very active multilateral diplomacies. Their 
effectiveness, however, in shaping multilateralism has been questionable. It could be 
argued that Brazil and South Africa’s multilateral influence has mostly evident in 
terms of legitimacy rather than material contribution. Certain institutions have been 
perceived as Western-centric, hegemonic and exclusionary, and can only be 
legitimised through the inclusion of middle-ranking states that allow for greater 
representation of non-Western regions, such as Africa and South America. Brazil and 
South Africa have been willing and able to secure such multilateral positions. Most 
multilateral institutions, however, could operate in the absence of Brazil and South 
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Africa’s participation. The emerging polycentrism in global governance that is now 
exemplified by the G-20 summit has created conditions where middle powers have 
enhanced their position in the international hierarchy to achieve ‘status equality’ with 
major powers but also with other emerging states (Cooper, 2015). Such a fluid 
environment provides other middle powers such as MIKTA with the opportunities to 
act as ‘policy innovators’ in key areas of global governance (ibid). 
In terms of geographical representation, Brazil has been unable to monopolise the role 
of the voice of South America. Other states like Argentina, Chile and Venezuela have 
not recognised Brazil’s right to represent the continent in fora such as the G20 and the 
UNSC, while Mexico has been perceived by some states as a more successful 
economic model representing the broader Latin American region (Wehner, 2015). 
Also, President Rousseff’s (2011-16) retreat from foreign policy activism has 
undermined Brazil’s multilateral position since the country has failed to attend critical 
summits (G20, Davos World Economic Forum), has delayed payments to the UN, and 
has drastically reduced the budget allocation to the Ministry of External Affairs and to 
certain diplomatic missions abroad (Muggah, 2015). South Africa has enjoyed a 
relatively more advantageous position compared to Brazil, having maintained the title 
of Africa’s largest economy for most the post-Cold War period, even though Nigeria 
gained such economic primacy during 2014 and 2016. South Africa has continued to 
monopolise the representation of Africa in global summits and has continuously been 
invited in multiple fora, such as the OECD, therefore enjoying the opportunity to 
address multiple audiences and project multiple identifies (Alexandroff, 2015). 
Compared, however, to President’s Mbeki’s campaign for ‘African Renaissance’, the 
Zuma administration has not taken full advantage of the political space that it has 
enjoyed in multilateral fora. South Africa has not identified strategic priorities in its 
G20 diplomacy, has not grasped the opportunity to host a G20 conference, and has 
not collaborated with other members such as France and South Korea that favour 
promoting a developmental agenda (Alden and Schoeman, 2015a). To sum up, Brazil 
and South Africa have not affected the functionality and effectiveness of multilateral 
institutions, even though South Africa’s multilateral position has retained a critical 
legitimacy function as Africa’s sole representative. 
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The third criterion suggests that Brazil and South Africa must be effective in crisis 
management and contribute to global order and stability in order to be classified as 
middle powers. Despite fluctuations in their multilateral diplomacy, Brazil and South 
Africa are seen as democratic and economically liberal states that constantly retain the 
potential to contribute to global stability. The liberal order itself is understood to be 
strengthened by “democratic middle powers” such as Brazil, India and South Africa 
that commit to liberal values, as opposed to “part-time spoilers” such as China, Russia 
and Iran that remain ambivalent to integrating to liberal institutions (Ikenberry, 2014). 
In recent years, the democratic systems of Brazil and South Africa have been 
undermined by political instability, investigations of corruption, leadership failures 
(with President Rousseff impeached in 2016), and questions of legality over the 
practices of the major ruling parties (Vogl, 2016). Nevertheless, Brazil and South 
Africa’s developmental policies have contributed to alleviating both domestic and 
international crises. For Brazilian elites, an assertive foreign policy has comprised a 
legitimation strategy that helps alleviating the adverse consequences of integrating 
into the global economy and promoting more inclusive agendas that address the 
marginalised segments of society (Sandal, 2014). South African governments have 
also sought to address the interests of different classes and groups through a 
humanitarian foreign policy that promotes and same objectives at the domestic and 
international level, and accommodates both liberalisation and redistribution policies 
(Van Der Westhuizen, 2013). 
The propensity of Brazilian and South African diplomacy towards crisis management 
has served to diffuse deadlocks in different multilateral fora. In the early ministerials 
of the Doha Round of the WTO, both states acted as bridge-builders between North 
and South and helped sustain the centrality of the WTO as the principal forum for 
negotiating international trade (Alden and Vieira, 2005). Through their continuous 
focus at promoting Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing 
countries, Brazil and South Africa contributed to collective understandings in the 
global South that the WTO comprises the main forum for addressing the relationship 
between trade and development. While the WTO has been partially undermined by 
the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements after the 2008 economic 
crisis, the two states have strived to engage developed countries in the WTO. For 
example, Brazil’s co-sponsorship of a proposal with the EU in 2015 aimed to advance 
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a more ambitious package on the export competition pillar of agricultural 
liberalisation in order to persuade developed countries to remain committed to a 
comprehensive agricultural package. Brazil and South Africa have performed similar 
roles in areas like climate change, non-proliferation and humanitarian intervention, 
while their activism in global development issues has been driven, rather than 
undermined, by their domestic problems. For example, South Africa’s approach has 
suggested that international development assistance is a commitment to be upheld 
even when domestic redistribution has not sufficiently advanced in alleviating poverty 
for many citizens domestically (Yanacopulos, 2014). The important observation here 
is that the agency of the two states has served to increase the participation and 
representation of developing countries in global governance, even if the outcomes of 
multilateral processes remain uncertain, as noted above. This is not a contradiction 
since both states have often opted for strengthening their Third World credentials to 
the detriment of adopting self-centred diplomatic approaches that would only satisfy 
their material interests. Their agency has propelled the global South to adopt more 
reformist positions and abolish revisionist tendencies, and has therefore contributed to 
regional and systemic stability. 
The fourth criterion of the behaviour model suggests that Brazil and South Africa can 
be classified as middle powers if they demonstrate selective engagement in their 
foreign policies with multiple and critical areas of global governance. In the case of 
Brazil, the country’s engagement with post-Cold War global governance has broadly 
entailed two major areas: the management of the global economy and development 
through activism in the WTO and other economic fora, and the management of global 
peace and security through participation in UN deliberations and peacekeeping 
operations (Christensen, 2013). During the Lula administration, the country’s foreign 
policy became active in the majority of issues pertaining to global governance 
(including human rights, climate change, non-proliferation) in an effort to elevate 
Brazil to the rank of a major power. Brazil’s engagement, however, has been 
constrained by two factors. First, it has remained dependant upon coalitions with 
other Southern states (such as IBSA and BRICS) in order to voice its preferences and 
promote a Southern view on how to resolve global hazards (Hirst, 2015). Second, 
limited access to the core decision-making of certain institutions (such as the UNSC, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) has forced Brazil to advocate 
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for the reform of these institutions in order to create the conditions that would 
facilitate its global influence. Brazil’s activism has therefore remained concentrated to 
particular areas of global governance while the country’s passive foreign policy under 
Rousseff has increasingly necessitated a policy of selective engagement. 
Like Brazil, South Africa has also been active in both global economic and global 
security issues. South Africa’s voluntary dismantling of its nuclear programme after 
the end of apartheid and its subsequent international elevation as the only ‘roll-back’ 
nuclear state provided South Africa with an international moral standing and allowed 
it to capture a unique niche in the non-proliferation regime (Van Wyk, 2012). South 
Africa also actively engaged with global trade and development, including its role as 
the leading African state in promoting the Doha Development Agenda and acting as 
Africa’s representative in various negotiating committees of the WTO. In recent 
years, there has been a shift towards a form of selective engagement that prioritises 
economic over security issues. To some degree, this has been the result of the 
overstretching of South Africa’s foreign policy, the contradictions in the country’s 
positions on human rights, and its Southern shift towards Africa and the BRICS. The 
Zuma administration has now declared that the priorities of South African foreign 
policy are about attracting FDI, strengthening economic ties with the BRICS and 
providing leadership for the African continent. President Zuma’s repeated 
pronouncement that economic diplomacy is South Africa’s ‘apex priority’ and his 
lack of reference to peace and security issues (Allison, 2016), have confirmed that 
South Africa displays the selective engagement of a middle power since it retains its 
diplomatic activism in critical areas of global governance, even if these now include 
mainly economic and developmental issues. 
The fifth aspect of the behavioural model argues that Brazil and South Africa can be 
classified as middle powers if they are successful in providing intellectual and 
entrepreneurial leadership that can have an impact, even when operating against the 
preferences of major powers. Brazil and South Africa have strived to provide new 
ideas for global governance while exerting influence through their diplomatic 
expertise. In contrast to Western middle powers such as Canada and Australia that 
have traditionally contributed to US-led policies, Brazil has assumed assertive 
initiatives that have been reflective of middle power leadership and which have run 
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counter to US preferences, such as its 2010 effort at brokering a nuclear energy 
agreement with Iran (Neack, 2013). Brazil’s initiatives, however, have often suffered 
from contradictions due to the over-ambitious roles assumed by the country in global 
affairs, the lack of material resources and the contradictions created by Brazil’s 
solidarity with the global South. Brazil has mostly acted as an international manager 
that promotes order, stability and consistency in regional and global affairs through 
international law and consensus-building diplomacy (Gardini, 2016). For example, 
Brazil’s has promoted the norm of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) as an 
alternative to R2P with the aim of constraining the use of military force and 
strengthening the authority of the UNSC. While Brazil initially promoted the concept 
in opposition to the NATO operations in Libya, it has failed in recent years to provide 
a new concept paper on the specifics of RwP and has withdrawn from the sponsorship 
of the concept (Kenkel and Stefan, 2016). Such an approach shows Brazil’s 
willingness to act against the preferences of major powers, but fails to provide a 
sustained from of leadership that can generate new ideas and practices in global 
governance. 
In South Africa’s case, leadership has been very much dependant upon recognition by 
Western and non-Western powers. South Africa’s intellectual leadership includes 
different diplomatic initiatives such as promoting an African approach to R2P, 
promoting closer coordination between the UNSC and the African Union Peace and 
Security Council, prioritising a Southern agenda for Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) in the WTO, and ensuring that the newly formed BRICS Development Bank 
will prioritise the funding of Africa’s development. South Africa has acted as norm 
entrepreneur in the African Union by promoting norms of human security, negotiated 
forms of conflict-resolution, and the protection of vulnerable populations, while 
applying these norms through its participation in conflicts in Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. It has also been the first African country to join and 
ratify the Rome Stature of the International Criminal Court (ICC), defying US 
pressures to exit the organisation and suffering as a consequence material costs in 
decreased US military aid funding (Grant and Hamilton, 2016). While such leadership 
would meet the behavioural definition proposed in this paper, recent years have 
witnessed a retreat from a right-based foreign policy as South Africa has announced it 
will withdraw from the ICC, while its closer alignment with the BRICS has forced 
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South Africa to refrain from any initiatives that would undermine its relations with 
these states. Due its diplomatic activism, South Africa has continuously been 
rewarded with positions that allow it to act as the representative of Africa in key fora 
such as the G20, the UNSC and the Green Room negotiations of the WTO. Such 
‘symbolic hegemony’, however, has remained dependant upon the willingness of 
other powers to support, both ideationally and materially, South Africa’s approach to 
regional governance (Alden and Schoeman, 2015b). South Africa’s leadership 
therefore appears successful in promoting alternative ideas for global governance, but 
remains heavily dependant upon other Western and Southern powers for promoting its 
preferences and appears unable to act in opposition to these other powers. 
The final aspect of the behavioural model suggests that Brazil and South Africa can 
be classified as middle powers if they can provide leadership that is both 
indispensable in facilitating like-minded coalitions and distinct from the band-
wagoning and counter-balancing functions performed by other states. Both states have 
acted as catalysts in forming and leading coalitions that include regional formations, 
coalitions with other developing countries, and coalitions with other Southern powers. 
In the WTO, coalitions such as the G-20 (Trade), which was led by Brazil, and 
NAMA-11, which was led by South Africa, have exercised pressure against major 
economies and have mobilised smaller states into forms of assertive diplomacy that 
would be unfeasible in the absence of Brazil and South Africa’s leadership. Brazil and 
South Africa have also been instrumental in forming new forms of global coalitions 
that are centred on Southern powers. In 2003, the formation of the IBSA Dialogue 
Forum was heralded as a new form of Southern leadership that departed from the 
traditional bloc diplomacy of the Third World and allowed for more flexible and 
proactive forms of coalition-building that sought to shape, rather than resist, the 
norms and organising principles of the liberal order (Alden and Vieira, 2005). 
Many academic works have questioned whether the IBSA and the BRICS states share 
common views, expectations and interests over the current state and future of the 
liberal international order. It has also been noted that the voting behaviour of the 
IBSA and BRICS states in different fora such as the UN Human Rights Council and 
the UN General Assembly demonstrate a divergence of interests, and a lack of 
common vision and strategy (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire, 2016; Jordaan, 2015). 
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The IBSA Forum also appears to have been marginalised since 2011, when South 
Africa joined the BRICS, and has not been holding regular summit since that point. 
Despite such limitations, the BRICS group has remained a foremost priority for both 
Brazil and South Africa since it has largely comprised their main source of influence 
in international affairs. While many have viewed the group as obstructionist and 
typical of counter-balancing and defensive behaviour, the group’s consistent 
advocacy of reforming global governance has been reflective of a new form of 
international responsibility that seeks to provide global public goods in issues such as 
trade, the environment and human rights (Culp, 2016). Despite divergent material 
interests and preferences, the group has often been cohesive (such as resisting Russia 
been expelled from the G20 after the Ukraine crisis) and has served as the archetype 
for new forms of South-South cooperation, with other states attempting to emulate its 
functions (such as the MIKTA group). In conclusion, Brazil and South Africa have 
performed an indispensable role in establishing new forms of South-South coalition-
building. Even though the degree of like-mindedness in specific formations such as 
the IBSA and BRICS groups is debatable, these new forms of cooperation and 
coordination between Southern powers have clearly been consolidated as a prime 
form of international relations for Brazil, South Africa and the other states that 
participate in these groups. 
 
Conclusion 
The distinctive category of the behavioural model discussed in this article provides a 
set of additional criteria for classifying middle powers. To adhere to a rigid selection 
process, this article proposes that states that fail to meet any of these criteria cannot be 
considered as full-fledged middle powers. In this respect, all six criteria can be 
considered as equally important for middle power classification, especially since they 
are inter-linked in terms of both ideational influence and entrepreneurial 
effectiveness. Many middle range-states would therefore fail to meet some or even all 
of the aforementioned behavioural patterns and other terms must be used for 
classifying such states (such as regional, secondary or intermediate states). It is 
therefore expected that middle powers would derive from the category of middle-
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range states but comprise a more select group of states that display both the 
willingness and capacity to shape international affairs. 
The cases of Brazil and South Africa demonstrate how the distinctive category of the 
behavioural model allows for a more rigid selection process. While the two cases 
meet four of the behavioural criteria (good international citizenship, crisis 
management diplomacy, selective engagement and coalition-building with like-
minded states), they fail to fully meet two criteria (multilateral influence and 
leadership). Both states have demonstrated a strong propensity for multilateral 
activism and leadership in their foreign policy, but their performance has been 
fluctuating, especially during recent administrations in the two countries. While under 
the traditional behavioural model it would have been sufficient for Brazil and South 
Africa to demonstrate preference for such forms of diplomatic engagement in order to 
be classified as middle powers, shifting emphasis to ideational influence and 
entrepreneurial effectiveness suggests that the two states’ global role as middle 
powers can be questioned. 
Such classification has important implications for the study of emerging states from 
the global South. The behavioural model allows for a more thorough examination of 
the agency of emerging powers in international politics, and questions the 
internationalist impact of emerging states that seek to establish their regional 
dominance and act as major players in international politics. In terms of the regional 
dimension, many emerging states aspire to project and consolidate their regional 
leadership but this is not sufficient for being classified as middle powers. Such states 
are often confined to regional systems, constrained by regional rivalries, lacking the 
capacity for foreign policy innovation and often remaining confined to a reactive and 
defensive foreign policy mode. While the literature suggests that such regionally 
oriented states bear certain similarities with the statecraft and foreign policy displayed 
by middle powers, the behavioural model presented in this article demonstrates that 
such states would fail to meet most of the aforementioned behavioural criteria, even if 
they demonstrate a preference for a middle power role. Many emerging states 
therefore posses middle-range capabilities that shape, to a certain extent, their options 
towards stronger and weaker states, but only a limited number normally opts for 
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deploying such capabilities on an international rather than a regional level, while also 
being relatively effective in the pursuit of such assertive internationalist initiatives. 
In terms of major power ambitions, the behavioural model reveals the possibility that 
emerging states from the global South can display middle power behaviour even if 
they possess material capabilities above the middle-range category. There are two 
principal reasons why this may be the case. First, the influence of emerging states in 
international regimes is not only determined by their material capabilities but also by 
their ideational and entrepreneurial resources. This point is often omitted in the 
current literature that views the material capabilities of emerging states as easily 
convertible into increased power and influence. Such determinism does not account 
for types of internationalism that are more reflective of a middle power orientation in 
foreign policy, as has been discussed in this article. Second, and linked to the above, 
emerging states	 often appear reluctant to provide structural leadership in order to 
reshape global governance and rather opt for a moderate approach to international 
negotiations across critical issues such as global trade, climate change and 
humanitarian intervention. Such states are unwilling to fully mobilise their resources 
to transform international regimes and often remain confined to cautious middle 
power roles, at least in the short-run. These cases can fit the behavioural model 
presented in this article and demonstrate that emerging states from the global South 
can pursue a middle power path before they reach the position through which they can 
assume major power rights and responsibilities. The behavioural model overall 
highlights both the possibilities and limitations of the foreign policies of emerging 
states, and suggests that prior to any discussion on whether such states can assume 
major power roles, it is first necessary to examine their global influence and 
effectiveness as middle powers. 
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